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INHERENT CONSTRAINTS AND CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES: EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN KENYA Introduction
In 2009, the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Lord Mandelson declared in a report commissioned by his department that 'We all know intuitively ... that only organisations that truly engage and inspire their employees produce world-class levels of innovation, productivity and performance' (quoted in MacLeod and Clarke, 2009: 1) . And when Baringa Partners, a management consultancy company, won the UK Best Workplace Award for the second year running in 2011, their managing partner highlighted their 'cultural energy rooted in a sense of pride, fairness and involvement. Despite our rapid growth (35% in the previous year), people still feel that they can influence the direction of the company' (Mansour, quoted in Finn, 2011: 8 ).
Yet such powerful convictions fly in the face of longstanding academic scepticism about employee involvement. For Strauss (2006) , worker participation is a volatile phenomenon which, having experienced three waves of popularity since World War Two, is currently in a trough (see also Cox et al., 2006) . i For Argyris (1998: 105) , another veteran observer, employee empowerment programmes (a 'third-wave' initiative in Strauss's terms) are 'the emperor's new clothes' because 'the change programs that could create high levels of ... empowerment do not yet exist.' Yet like
Mandelson and Mansour, Strauss and Argyris continue to advocate participation.
Despite the ebbs and flows, the belief stubbornly persists.
This paper advances our understanding of employee participation in two ways. First, it reports empirical findings from a sector which has a major impact on global wellbeing: the development sector and in particular the INGOs which have their bases in industrialized countries but operate mostly in developing countries. We shall see that their distinctive approach offers instructive comparisons with the mainly for-profit private companies in industrialized countries which have been the venue for most of the participation studies in the HR literature.
Second, our paper brings together two widely separated discourses for the first time:
in HR and international development, the latter dealing with the participation of development programme 'beneficiaries' (the communities and individuals for which development agencies provide services or act as advocates). Wilkinson and Fay (2011: 66) have observed that 'scholars (of participation) from diverse traditions often know relatively little of the research that has been done in other areas.' It will surprise some readers of IJHRM to learn that we owe the term 'voice', which in recent years has largely overtaken 'participation' in the HR literature, to the international development literature, through Hirschman's (1970) analysis of goods transport on Nigerian railways (Dundon et al., 2004 (Dundon et al., : 1151 . HR scholars of participation can repay the debt they already owe to international development by bringing our expertise to bear on development questions such as those which are treated in this article.
Our study questions are:
1. What are the styles of employee participation in INGOs operating in Kenya?
2. How should we understand them?
3. What do we learn from the case study about the potential and constraints of employee participation?
INGOs in international development
Increasingly over the past 30 years, INGOs have facilitated aid distribution through delivery of personal services in poor countries. From the 1980s onwards, they have been favoured by official donor agencies such as the World Bank and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), who have seen them as flexible, cost-effective and reliable (Chambers, 1987; Hyden, 1983) . In 2009 17.3%, or US 2.1 billion, of international humanitarian assistance was channeled through NGOs (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011).
Kenya's capital, Nairobi, as a transportation hub hosts the regional offices of some of the world's largest INGOs, such as Oxfam International, CARE International and World Vision. By 2007, there were roughly 4500 national and international NGOs operating in Kenya, four times as many as in 1997. The sector makes a significant contribution to the Kenyan economy, employing 291,000 full-time equivalent employees compared with roughly 677,000 for the entire Kenyan public sector.
( Kanyinga et al., 2007) .
For our case study we sampled at least one of each of the three major NGO types:
'relief and welfare agencies', whose raison d'être is emergency relief; 'public service contractors', which are funded by donors to implement their programmes; and 'popular development agencies', which work with Southern agencies to promote social development and grassroots democracy (Clark, 1991) . All the NGOs sampled are international in scope, with headquarters in either North America or Europe (one agency had moved its operating base from Europe to Nairobi).
Employee participation
In this section we provide a framework for making sense of the research findings we will present later on. We review the participation debate: definitions of participation, its degrees of penetration in different organizations and its practical forms; the main rationales that have been advanced for it; two inherent constraints on its scope; and a number of contingencies that affect it in different places.
Definition, degrees and forms
'Hirschman was exercised by the problem of how to improve the performance of an organization when the economic stimulus of customer exit was unavailable or ineffective. 'Voice' was his solution. 'Voice' refers to feedback from service users or customers on the quality of the service they have received.
Hirschman's notion became influential in international development, notably in the development across all three continents of the South of 'citizen report cards' for the performance of public services (Paul, 1992; World Bank, 2004) . It was imported into the industrial relations literature by Freeman (1980) . Identifying it with collective bargaining between unions and employers, Freeman found that it reduced staff turnover, or 'exit' in Hirschman's terms. It was the 'exit-voice tradeoff' which prompted him to adopt Hirschman's neologism.
Freeman was true to Hirschman's original usage in that he was interested in workers being able to influence, and not merely express an opinion on (as is sometimes the case in the HR discourse), the direction of their organizations (see also Strauss, 2006; and G. Wood, 2010) . Hirschman and Freeman's usage gives us our definition of participation.
The distinction which we have just implied between degrees of participation (the term we will mostly use in preference to voice) is important. Wilkinson et al.'s (2010) 'escalator of participation' is a suitable working model (see Figure One below). We note that it has a managerial flavour in comparison with the six forms of participation which Poole (1992) identified in an industrial relations (IR) context:
shop-floor programmes, trade union action, works councils, co-determination, producer co-operatives and workers' self-management.
There is also an important distinction between 'indirect participation', where workers are represented at their own initiative by an independent intermediary (typically a trade union, though other representative structures are possible); and 'direct participation', where management initiates its own communication with employees.
When we turn to the forms of participation, we find a considerable yet unrecognized overlap between organizational practice and international development. Both domains host practices loosely grouped under the headings of empowerment (Argyris, 1998; Luttrell et al 2009: 21) and partnership (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Fowler, 2000) . These, and also some distinctive forms in the two sectors, are respectively reviewed in Wilkinson et al. (2010) and World Bank (1996) .
Rationales
Efficiency has been the predominant rationale for participation in the organizational literature. It also figures in the international development literature. 'Staff perform best when they are involved in decisions that affect them,' declares the Code of Practice produced by People in Aid (2003: 14) , an agency with a remit for HR in the INGO sector. Participation is argued to promote efficiency in two ways: first, by giving employers access to crucial knowledge that employees hold: that is a central tenet of so-called 'high performance work systems' (Wood and de Menezes, 2008) ; and second, through its effect on motivation, tapping into 'organizational citizenship behaviour' (OCB).
There are reports of participation improving performance in both the organizational and the international development literatures (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin, 1987; Isham et al., 1995) . But the organizational literature has notoriously failed to establish a secure causal relationship, right up to the present (S. . Even the strong evidence of an association between OCB and organizational performance (Podsakoff et al., 2009) contains an element of tautology: it is hardly surprising that behaviour defined by its impact on organizational performance does indeed improve performance.
In consequence, much of the impetus behind participation initiatives has come from normative rather than efficiency concerns. Building on Wilkinson and Fay's (2011) four theoretical paradigms of participation, we identify three normative rationales in addition to the efficiency rationale (Table One) .
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An ethical view of employees as autonomous Kantian subjects iii is the first of those normative rationales. It entails 'a vast democratization of the workplace,' and puts participation on a par with efficiency as an organizational objective (Bowie, 1999: 102; Budd, 2004) . A political view (the second normative rationale) accords workers a democratic right to participate: 'If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises' (Dahl, 1985: 111) .
These rationales have had a practical impact in the creation of employee-owned trusts like the UK's John Lewis Partnership (Bradley and Estrin, 1992) , and in the emergence of works councils in Germany. It was works councils which led in the end to the European Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations (2004), which in turn require employers in the EU to set up an elected participation structure when their workers request it (Davies, 2009; Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Müller-Jentsch, 2008 ).
Works councils are also an expression of the classic industrial relations rationale: participation designed to benefit workers' pay and conditions. Reflecting that rationale, IR writers like Freeman and Strauss have explicitly viewed collective bargaining as participation's only valid form.
These ethical and political rationales are even stronger in the international development and related literatures -'very few think … participation is a bad thing' (Birch, 2007: 145) -with the major difference that they mostly apply to beneficiaries, not employees, about whose participation the international development literature has relatively little to say (though see Fowler 1997; and Suzuki 1998) . For the Nobel Prize-winning development economist Amartya Sen (1999) , participation is nothing less than the process aspect of freedom. Since Sen equates freedom with development itself, participation in this view does not merely enhance development but becomes part of what constitutes it (see also Cortina, 2007: 11) .
With the ethical rationale augmented by a political one, in which development beneficiaries are conceived as citizens who should be ''makers and shapers' rather than 'users and choosers of interventions … designed by others' (Cornwall, 2000; Gaventa, 2004: 29) , we find participation framed as a human right in the UN's 1986
Declaration of the Right to Development, and in so-called rights-based approaches to development (Hamm, 2001) . 
Constraints
Yet we know that most organizations do not get there. In this and the following section we review some relevant constraints and contingencies which help to explain why. For clarity's sake we have summarized them in Table Two. INSERT They must also find a formal way of supplying the leadership function, failing which they are likely to acquire an informal leadership -an organizational application of Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy'. And informal leadership may be insidious, being outside the procedural checks which unions prize as a bulwark against arbitrary management authority.
The 'iron law' applies every bit as much to employee-owned companies as to conventional ones. The UK's celebrated John Lewis Partnership has a chief executive who appoints managers, and also his successor, in the regular way.
Managers in Spain's equally celebrated and equally successful Mondragon Cooperative are elected rather than appointed, but they still constitute a recognizable hierarchy and exercise conventional authority over their staff (Bradley and Estrin, 1992; Lutz, 1997 ; see also Prasnikar, 1996) .
The second inherent constraint is the need to balance competing stakeholder
interests. An organization's stakeholders are conceptualized as individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by what the organization does. They can be categorized in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997) . As such, they clearly include owners, managers and workers, and, additionally and significantly, some groups outside the organization about which the HR and IR literatures have had relatively little to say.
We can appreciate the stakeholder model's radical implication for worker participation by relating it to Fox's (1974) To be sure, the stakeholder model stipulated that management as well as employees should make room for the external stakeholders. But doing so -and let us concede that management may try to ignore its stakeholders, however short-sighted or unethical that might be -strengthens management's position in one important respect.
Consider the external stakeholders' position, outside the organization with no formal purchase upon it. They are not owners or managers, nor a trade union with bargaining rights. Hence in the stakeholder model it falls to management, by default, to represent their interests, and balance them against those of the internal stakeholders, including employees.
This aspect of stakeholder management is unfavourable to the employee interest. For as Kerr and Caimando (2004: 86) interests as an argument (or an excuse) for rejecting employees' preferences.
Contingencies
Case studies like ours, being rich in detail, provide an insight into the contingencies which mark participation in different workplaces. At the international level, indirect forms of participation -'extensive participatory rights ... linked closely to strong overarching unions' -are more prevalent in 'co-ordinated market economies' like Germany and Sweden than in 'liberal market economies' like Australia and the US (Brewster et al., 2007; Thelen, 2001: 102) . A 'host country effect' occurs when things are the other way round.
At the national level, developing countries like Kenya where our case study is situated have a dualistic economic structure, with large informal and subsistence agriculture sectors and a small formal economy, and the latter further segmented between multinational corporations and indigenous firms which are often familybased (Siddique, 1989; G. Wood, 2010) . In Kenya's formal economy, the government's stance has been to 'choreograph' the union movement to facilitate employers (Kamoche et al., 2004: 95) . With the economy growing at less than 5%
per annum over the last decade even after two previous decades of stagnation, while population growth has been at roughly 2.6%, and with a consequent unemployment rate estimated at over 30% in April 2011, workers' bargaining power is weak.
Union membership was at 4.3% in 1999, and employers have been under little pressure from their workers to concede the right to participate; for Nyambegera et al. (2001: 133) , its existence is merely theoretical. This may be reinforced in African countries like Kenya by high 'power distance', that is, a cultural tendency to defer to authority, and an expectation that leaders will adopt a paternal management style (Blunt and Jones, 1997; Hofstede, 2010; Jackson, 2002) . Employees in Kenya's agricultural sector who experienced little opportunity to participate felt little frustration because they never expected to participate in the first place (Mulinge and Mueller, 1998) ; in marked contrast with their counterparts in 12 UK organizations, who were demotivated by lack of influence over company decisions (Purcell et al., 2003) .
At the organizational level, participation may be squeezed out by financial pressure on the organization (Cunningham and Hyman, 1999; Humphreys and Hoque, 2007) .
Argyris (1998) and Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) have argued that management should drive through any necessary retrenchment before they embark on strategizing and development activities such as participation and 'empowerment.'
Participation is also affected by management style. Hirschman himself (1976) observed that exercising voice may result in either reprisals or rewards: punishment of whistle-blowers and rewards for organizational citizenship behaviour are examples (Near and Miceli, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2009; Van Dyne, 1998) . Since workers are more likely to speak up when managers show they are listening, it follows that employee voice is a delicate plant that managers need to take some trouble to nurture (Detert and Burris, 2007; Morrison and Milliken, 2003) .
Methodology
We will now report a case study of INGOs operating in Kenya. They are anonymized as Agencies A to G. As Strauss (2006: 796) notes, case studies have the potential to get into the 'little black box, the intervening variables between participation and its outcomes.' However, the case method requires care in generalizing from the case; and thus in answering our study question 3 (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Data collection and analysis
Data was collected in the first half of 2011. As well as reviewing agency documents, we recorded and transcribed 39 semi-structured individual interviews: 28 with senior managers at the case agencies, including country directors and assistant directors and HR managers; five with operational officers and elected staff representatives; and six with staff of other organizations which interact with the case agencies.
We have borrowed the process tracing method from political science, where it is used to understand political events in the round when they are marked by multiple interacting variables (George and Bennett, 2005) . As far as we know, process tracing has been used in organization studies up to now only to assess how individuals make decisions, not organizations (Ford et al., 1989) . We use it to throw light on agencies' actual, as opposed to formal, priorities by asking interviewees to recall recent important management decisions, the process by which they were made and the actors involved in them.
Although we agree with Strauss (2006) that adding survey data strengthens a case research design, we were unable to administer the employee survey instrument which we developed, due to pressure of work in the INGOs at the time of our research (caused partly by a tragic influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia). We draw instead on existing employee surveys furnished by three of the agencies, and on interviews with line staff in three agencies, elected staff representatives in two agencies, and with an officer in an external body which promotes HR practice in INGOs in Kenya. We also draw on existing beneficiary survey data for two agencies.
Employee participation: findings
The funding chain and the internal hierarchy
In this section we begin with a feature which in different degrees is common ground for all the agencies. As is increasingly the case in this sector (Wallace, 2006 ), Kenya's INGOs typically v do business through a lengthy chain.
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They receive a great deal of their money from official donor agencies, as we noted at the start of the article. Their institutional imperative to maximize funding has been argued to militate against beneficiary participation (Anderson, 2001; Fowler and Biekart, 1996) . Moreover, in keeping with current development thinking, six of the INGOs used local 'partners' (indigenous NGOs which may have a better understanding than INGOs of complex local relations) to implement some or all of their programmes: (Marcussen 1996 ; see also Kanyinga, 1995 for Kenya).
In addition, INGOs' hierarchies constitute an internal chain, so to speak. Apart from conventional staff meetings, only employee surveys among the popular forms of direct participation in industrialized countries had taken root.
Employee participation practice
Due to pressure of space, we now provide a narrative description of the style of participation in only four of our case agencies. We will draw on data from the remaining three agencies in later sections. When one bears in mind that most of A's staff were on short-term contracts, field managers' insistence on talking about pay and job security when a senior manager tried to engage with them on the shift to programme mode is perhaps understandable.
Managers also had discretion over how they involved beneficiaries, the other main stakeholder. However, since C retained partnership working as a 'fundamental value,' it invited beneficiaries and also donors to what was intended to be C's first annual review and planning workshop in late 2010, just before our data-gathering. The agency's own staff were in a minority at the workshop, so to the extent that the workshop informed agency policy (it concluded with 'propositions' rather than recommendations), the effect of involving other stakeholders was to dilute the staff input. Readers may note that this was very much in line with Kerr and Caimando's argument.
'You are formally required to say that you have met (beneficiaries
The workshop was C's only formal mechanism for staff input into policy. For although C had a staff association, it operated as a welfare body. Staff as members had to contribute, and their dues were used for modest purposes such as buying baskets of fruit for staff who fell ill. With communication between staff and management that existed only 'to some extent, to be honest, to some extent: people are human beings' -as in A, HR became a default conduit for staff concerns, and also sometimes for management to inform staff: a 'man (sic) in the middle' HR role which older readers may recognize (Thomason, 1976 ).
Agency D was little different from A in its formal structures, which in the eyes of two of its managers were weaker than at other aid agencies where they had worked.
There was no staff association, and a union only at headquarters.
However, tracing the process used to deal with what was by common consent the biggest recent management issue, the sharp decline in D's funding which followed the global financial crisis of 2007/8 and which resulted in some compulsory redundancies, disclosed vigorous informal participation, albeit within strict limits.
Retrenchment was initiated by the Agency's HQ, which indicated the savings that would be needed. In relation to local discretion, 'the red line … is in budgetary control more than anything else' (the 'financial pressure' contingency which we noted earlier). But contradicting the view in the literature that retrenchment should be driven through over employees' heads, management allowed a staff representative group to produce its own retrenchment priorities.
Results were mixed. On one hand, HQ overrode a request from the Kenya country office to protect the staff benefits package in order to avoid a disproportionate impact on African staff, who tend to have larger families; on the other, the Chief Executive backed down on a post that he personally wanted to keep. Management rejected the request for an increase in annual leave to offset the impending pay cut ('we didn't
think the Governing Body would buy it, and we didn't think the public would buy it');
but it did concede a half-day increase for one year only. (Notice how the general public is a stakeholder for D, since it relied on them to drop money into the collection tins which they rattled on street corners.)
At country level, D's Kenya country director asked the HR manager to consult staff on a proposal to reduce costs by abolishing a 'thirteenth month' bonus (the 'man in the middle' role again). The HR manager duly fed back staff's objections in some detail (for instance, the impact on staff's ability to pay their children's school fees).
But the country director went ahead anyway, arguing that the bonus was an anachronism, as it had been introduced to compensate for the absence of a pension scheme, something which D now had.
In addition, staff had two representatives of their own on the ad hoc country strategy steering committee. The country director in turn sat on the global strategy steering 
Staff councils and representatives
We now draw on data from two of the remaining three INGOs in our sample, since they were the only agencies which had formal representation structures, as noted in Table 3 . The structures lie somewhere between direct and indirect representation, in that they were management initiatives in both cases, but employee participation is somewhat autonomous, since employee representatives were elected -or at least, were supposed to be. G's HR manual mandated two elected staff representatives for every country.
However, we were told that across the globe, it was more honoured in the breach than the observance, and making it happen in Kenya was the country director's personal initiative. One of the representatives reported increasing the payment to drivers for mobile phone airtime and getting management to contribute to a staff outing as achievements, both the result of lobbying the country director. Although these were modest achievements, the representative was still positive about the initiative, and contrasted G favourably with another INGO where he had previously worked: 'Here is good, management listens.'
Discussion: explaining participation styles
We now step back from our findings to discuss their significance for our understanding of participation.
The styles of participation (study question 1)
Our research methods cannot reveal significant statistical correlations, both because we have used a qualitative design and because in quantitative language, ours is an N=7 study. However, there is some suggestive patterning in our findings, which we depict in terms of Wilkinson's 'escalator' in B and C had had forms of codetermination, as we saw. But both had retreated.
Let us recall that our agencies provided a very favourable environment for participation. They were not run for profit -no shareholders clamouring for a dividend -and they were shot through with a development rhetoric which venerates participation. Despite that, none of the agencies had found it appropriate to settle on either the 'control' or 'codetermination' participation style. They came to rest instead on the lower steps of the 'escalator', with consultation as the mode position. Why was that?
Explaining the styles (study question 2)
explain why the agencies ascended no higher than the consultation step/rung on the escalator/ladder. C tested the theory of employee control almost to destruction.
Putting the country managers in charge of the pivotal restructuring led to an inwardlooking emphasis on process at the expense of results that C's donors felt they had to squash. In reaction, C used performance management to reassert conventional hierarchical control.
In However, hierarchy and stakeholder constraints do not explain why three of the agencies stopped short even of the consultation step/rung. Why was that? We suggest three additional reasons.
1. The relationship between the style of participation and the CME/LME dimension (Table Three) . Both agencies with headquarters in a CME had an indirect participation structure; none of the four agencies based in an LME did. This 'home country effect' is consistent with Thelen's picture of relatively strong indirect participation in the CMEs. It was the creative initiative of D's managers that made participation meaningful. But Ramsay (1977) may be right to conclude that much more often, employers allow their staff to participate only when their staff make them. In countries where workers are more assertive than in Kenya with its high power distance, employees might nudge their managers to take the path of virtue and go one or two steps higher on the participation escalator.
i Marchington et al. (1993) and Ramsay (1977) also identify waves of enthusiasm for participation. ii Wilkinson and Fay build in their turn on Dundon et al.'s (2004 Dundon et al.'s ( : 1152 earlier taxonomy of meanings of employee voice. iii Kant's relevant maxim, in Popper's (1989a: 182) paraphrase, is 'Always regard every man as an end in himself, and never use him merely as a means to your ends.' iv We speculate that the similarity is because in both cases we are dealing with a collaborative but unequal relationship. Since such a relationship is anomalous in the light of the current norm of fundamental human equality, rationales must be advanced and regulations put in place to contain the anomaly. This may be why even skeptics like Argyris and Strauss continue to advocate participation. v The donor and partner 'links' are absent where INGOs use their own funds and (see Table Three ) where they implement their programmes directly. vi We follow the convention of italicizing direct quotations from our interviewees. vii There was, however, no straightforward host country effect in terms of national culture in our findings, which revealed a complex interplay of national, sub-national (e.g. Kikuyu) and organizational cultures. Pace Blunt and Jones and others, this perhaps refutes any essentialist view of 'Kenyan culture' influencing agencies' behaviour. viii We remind readers that our scope is confined to management, not ownership. We repeat that even employee-owned companies John Lewis Partnership and Mondragon tend to operate hierarchically. However, we note Ramsay's (1977: 498) final sentence: 'The whole political-economic environment will have ... to be transformed if a genuine industrial democracy is to prevail.' In our case, there is indeed something unsatisfactory about a world in which INGOs operate in developing countries but are accountable to Boards and donors in the North -as more thoughtful INGO staff would be the first to recognize (Edwards and Hulme, 1996 LME LME LME CME * CME/LME = co-ordinated/liberal market economy. i ** Home country staff only in all cases.
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Table 3
Summary data on case agencies i Among the larger OECD nations, co-ordinated market economies as per Hall and Soskice (2001: 19-20) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland; liberal market economies are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. Degrees of participation at case agencies
